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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

FRANK GENE POWELL,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900202-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a guilty plea to manslaughter, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205
(1990), in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issue on appeal is whether defendant understood the
effect of his guilty plea and the various constitutional and
statutory rights he was waiving.

A reviewing court "will not

interfere with a trial judge's determination that a defendant has
failed to show good cause [for withdrawal of a guilty plea]
unless it clearly appears that the trial judge abused his
discretion."

State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-11(e) (Supp. 1988) (amended
1989, repealed eff. July 1, 1990J.1
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or no contest and shall not accept
such a plea until the court has made the
findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not
represented by counsel he has knowingly
waived his right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a
jury trial and to confront and cross-examine
in open court the witnesses against him, and
that by entering the plea he waives all of
those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of
all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon
him for each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement
and if so, what agreement has been reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting
attorney or any other party has agreed to
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea
to a lesser included offense, or the
dismissal of other charges, the same shall be
approved by the court. If recommendations as
to sentence are allowed by the court, the
Effective April 24, 1989, former rule 11(e) was redesignated as
rule 11(5).
-2-

court shall advise the defendant personally
that any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 11, 1987 defendant was charged with second

degree murder,

a first

degree felony,

in violation

of Utah Code

Ann. S 76-5-203 (1990) (R. 19). On May 20, 1988, an amended
information was filed charging defendant with manslaughter, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205
(1990) (R. 81). On the same day defendant pleaded guilty to that
charge (R. 186). Defendant was sentenced to serve an
undetermined term of not less than one year or more than 15 years
at the Utah State Prison (R. 100-02).
On September 29, 1989, defendant filed a motion to
withdraw his plea (R. 104). A hearing on defendant's motion was
held on November 3, 1989.

The trial court issued a memorandum

decision denying defendant's motion on March 30, 1990 (R. 16878).

Defendant filed his notice of appeal on April 4, 1990 (R.

179).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 20, 1988, defendant entered a guilty plea to the
charge of manslaughter, a second degree felony in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990).

(A copy of the transcript of

the plea hearing is attached hereto as Addendum A ) . At the
hearing on defendant's guilty plea the trial judge asked
defendant his educational level and ability to read and speak the
English language (R. 183); whether defendant was being treated
for any mental illness or was under the influence of drugs or

-3-

alcohol (R. 184); whether defendant understood the constitutional
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty (R. 184); whether he
understood the contents of the affidavit explaining his rights
that he had reviewed with his attorney (R. 184) (a copy of
defendant's affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum B); whether
anyone had used any force, duress or coercion against him (R.
184); and whether defendant considered the statement of facts
concerning the events giving rise to the death in question, as
recounted by the county attorney, to be true and accurate (R.
185).

After defendant answered the questions to the trial

court's satisfaction, defendant was permitted to sign the
affidavit, and the court accepted his plea of guilty (R. 184-5).
The court stated that the plea was a result of a plea agreement
and that the court had discussed the agreement and its
circumstances with the county attorney (R. 185-86).
On September 29, 1989, defendant filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.

At the plea hearing defendant

testified that he did not realize that, by pleading guilty, he
was giving up his right to trial, to testify and to hear
witnesses against him (R. 192-94).

Defendant also testified that

he believed he would serve no more than 18 months in prison as a
result of his plea (195-96).

Defendant's trial counsel also

testified concerning the taking of defendant's plea.

He noted

that he was aware of defendant's limited educational background
and difficulty in understanding the legal concepts involved in a
guilty plea (R. 204). As a consequence, trial counsel
extensively reviewed and, at times, paraphrased the affidavits

-4-

defendant was to sign in conjunction with his plea. (R. 205-06,
208-18).

Included in the review was a discussion concerning

defendant's sentence, counsel's assessment of the time he thought
defendant would spend in prison, and the trial court's absolute
prerogative in imposing sentence (R. 212-14).

Trial counsel

firmly believed that defendant understood exactly the rights he
was waiving and the penalties that attached to a plea (R. 208).
In denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, the trial court, applying the "record on a whole" standard,
found that defendant's motive for moving to withdraw the plea was
"buyer's remorse" resulting from his failure to gain parole in 18
months (R. 177). He concluded that defendant understood his
guilty plea and its consequences (Ld.). (A copy of the trial
court's memorandum is attached hereto as Addendum C.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because defendant has failed to allege
that his rights have been violated substantially by the
acceptance of his plea, and the record supports the fact that
defendant's plea was voluntary and knowing.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA.
On appeal defendant claims that he did not fully
understand the effects of his plea and the various constitutional
and statutory rights he was waiving (Br. of App. at 6). However,
defendant makes no specific allegations as to what "effects" he
-5-

did not understand or what constitutional and statutory rights he
2
did not know he was waiving.
Defendant does not allege that his plea was not
intelligent and voluntary, the traditional indices used in
determining the validity of a guilty plea.

See Boykin v.

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1968); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d
1266, 1273 (Utah 1988).

Instead, defendant relies on an on-the-

record "strict compliance" with rule 11(e) argument to urge the
3
reversal of the trial court's ruling (Br. of App. at 14-15).
The State is fully aware of this Court's recent
decisions concerning withdrawals of guilty pleas.

This Court has

made it clear in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.
App.) cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988); State v. Valencia,
776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Gentry, 141 Utah
Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. August 24, 1990); and State v.
Pharris, No. 890549-CA (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1990), that it
The federal constitutional rights waived when a guilty plea is
entered include the fifth amendment rights against selfincrimination and of a trial by jury and the sixth amendment
right to confront one's accusers. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 234 (1968).
3
Defendant also offers a nominal "record as a whole" argument
but fails to specify what he did not understand at the time he
entered his plea. (Br. of App. at 16.) Moreover, in conjunction
with that argument defendant erroneously cited to Jolivet v.
Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (1989) cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 751 (1990), as
a case where the Utah Supreme Court upheld a lower court's
findings by applying "clear and convincing evidence" standard of
review. (Br. of App. at 16.) To the contrary, the court in
Jolivet applied the standard that it would "not set aside trial
court findings of fact as 'clearly erroneous' unless they . . .
[were] against the clear weight of the evidences, or . . • thev
appellate court otherwise reache[d] a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake [had] been made.'" Id. at 1150 (citing
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)";; Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a)).
-6-

will apply an on-the-record "strict compliance" with rule 11(e)
test in assessing the validity of a guilty plea, interpreting
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) as creating a
substantively new rule in guilty plea cases and replacing the
prior "record as a whole" test.

If this Court applies an on-the-

record "strict compliance" test to the instant case, it will
undoubtedly find that the trial court did not conduct the
complete on-the-record review with defendant of the rule 11(e)
requirements as mandated Vasilacopulos, Valencia, Gentry and
Pharris.
As set forth in its briefs in those cases, the State
believes that Gibbons did not substantively change the rule on
withdrawal of guilty pleas and that the "record as a whole" test
still governs the plea withdrawals.

Consequently, the State has

several cases pending before the Utah Supreme Court on this
4
issue.
Until the issue is finally resolved by that court, the
State will continue to urge that this Court reconsider the
"record as a whole" test and will continue to assert the
5
correctness of that standard.
The instant case excellently illustrates the
deficiencies the State sees in the application of the strict
compliance test.

Defendant fails to allege any specific harm

4
State v. Hoff, No. 900096, is currently before the Utah Supreme
Court, and the State is petitioning for writs of certiorari in
Gentry and Pharris.
Although the State concedes that, in light of Gentry and
Pharris, this Court is unlikely to retreat from its conclusion
that the record as a whole test no longer governs, it believes
that continued argument on this point is necessary to preserve
the issue for possible certiorari review.
-7-

suffered as a result of the taking of his guilty plea.

He does

not and cannot allege any constitutional deficiencies or that his
plea was not voluntary and knowing because he knew precisely what
he was doing when he entered his guilty plea.

At the time of his

plea defendant specifically stated that he had gone over the
affidavit explaining his rights with his attorney, that he knew
he was waiving certain constitutional rights and that those
rights had been explained to him by his attorney (R. 184). The
affidavit/ each paragraph of which is initialed, substantially
met rule 11(e) requirements.

Paragraphs 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 and

25 attest to the voluntariness of the plea as required by rule
11(e)(2) (R. 86-87).

Rule 11(e)(3)'s requirements that a

defendant know of certain constitutional rights he or she is
waiving are met as follows:

(1) the right against self-

incrimination in paragraph 8E; the right to jury trial in
paragraph 8; the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in
paragraphs 8B and C; and that a guilty plea constitutes a waiver
of those rights in paragraph 10B (R. 83, 84-85).

Paragraph 9

sets forth the elements of the offense, paragraphs 8G and 9 the
fact that the prosecution has the burden of proving each element
beyond a reasonable doubt and paragraph 10 the fact that a guilty
plea is an admission of the elements of the crime charged, as
required by rule 11(e)(4) (R. 83-84).

Rule 11(e)(5)'s

requirements that a defendant know of the maximum sentence that
may be imposed and the possibility of consecutive terms are met
in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 (R. 82-83).

Finally, paragraph

The affidavit does not specify the minimum sentence of "not
less than one year" for a second degree felony.
-8-

12 addresses the issue of a plea agreement, although perhaps not
applicable in this case, as required by rule 11(e)(6)(R. 85).
Defendant testified that no force, duress or coercion had been
used on him with regard to his entering the plea, and he admitted
as true the statement of the facts, as read in court, that
explained the events giving rise to the manslaughter charge (R.
184-85).
At the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea defendant denied that his trial attorney explained
the entire affidavit to him prior to his signing it and entering
his plea (R. 193-94).

That testimony contradicts his own and his

trial attorney's testimony at the time of the entry of the plea
and his trial attorney's later testimony at the hearing on the
motion to withdraw the plea (R. 183-84, 208-11).

Defendant

further alleged and testified that he did not realize that he was
giving up his right to a jury trial by pleading guilty and that
he thought he would be going to prison for 18 months by entering
his plea (R. 106, 195-96).

It defies all logic for defendant to

say that he expected a trial after entering his plea and at the
same time acknowledge that he knew he was going to prison as a
result of his plea.

Moreover, it was disingenuous of defendant,

notwithstanding his limited education, to assert that he did not
understand that pleading guilty to an offense meant that he would
not go to trial.

Defendant had signed an affidavit indicating he

understood that fact, and trial counsel testified that he had
discussed that matter with defendant (R. 83-84, 214). With
regard to defendant's claim that he believed he would be

•9-

imprisoned for only 18 months, his trial counsel extensively
testified to his discussion with defendant concerning defendant's
possible prison term and counsel's calculation concerning what
7
the Board of Pardons would do regarding parole (R. 212-14).
Finally, defendant asserted that he did not realize he was giving
up his right to appeal his sentence to the Utah Supreme Court (R.
106, 194). Trial counsel testified that he discussed with
defendant his very limited right to appeal his sentence should
the trial court exceed it's sentencing discretion (R. 211).
In its memorandum decision denying defendant's motion
the trial court found that defendant's motive in filing his
motion to withdraw his plea was not based on lack of knowledge
but on "buyer's remorse" after defendant found that he would
serve more than 18 months (R. 177). It concluded that trial
counsel's testimony was more believable than defendant's
testimony (Id*)•

T

clearly erroneous.

^e trial court's findings of facts were not
Defendant does not challenge those findings,

content to argue that there was not "strict compliance" with rule
11(e), a less demanding standard than the more reasonable
voluntariness/record as a whole standard.
As explained in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1986):
[the position] that otherwise voluntary and
lawful guilty pleas should always be voided
when the trial court violates any provision
of Rule 11. . • . is shortsighted, for to
At defendant's first parole hearing on April 28, 1989, he was
denied parole and scheduled for rehearing in January, 1992. He
did not file his motion to withdraw his plea until five months
later, more than 16 months after its entry.
-10-

follow it would be to sanction a remedy far
worse than the wrong. If we were to hold
that any violation of Rule 11 automatically
voids the resultant plea, even when the plea
is knowingly and voluntarily entered, we
would encourage defendants, convicted and
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their
convictions for purely tactical reasons,
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas
corpus long after the fact. We have refused
to overturn convictions upon such challenges
in the past . . . and we find no reason to
encourage such attacks in the future.
Overturning such convictions . . . would
require the State to reprosecute numerous
defendants, probably long after the
challenged guilty pleas were entered and when
the passage of time would make reprosecution
impractical, if not impossible. Almost
certainly, the ultimate result would be to
free a number of convicted persons for
nothing more than technical errors in the
acceptance of their voluntary guilty pleas.
717 P.2d 1301-02 (footnote and citations omitted).
In so reasoning, the Supreme Court held that the
"harmless error" rule would apply in matters involving a rule 11
violation and that a rule 11 error would not invalidate the plea
taken unless the error resulted in a substantial violation of a
party's rights. Ld. at 1302. The Kay analysis is still valid
law, and the Supreme Court did not overrule that case in Gibbons.
Gibbons, read in harmony with Kay, reiterates the care that must
be taken by the trial court to ensure a knowing and voluntary
guilty plea.

It requires a greater scrutiny on the part of the

trial court than a mechanical recitation of the rule 11
requirements but leaves the traditional "record as a whole" test
intact.

See, e.g., State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah

1986); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v.
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985).
-11-

The "record as a whole" test was adhered to by the Utah
Supreme Court in the only post-Gibbons plea case thus far issued
by that court, State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989). 8

There,

Justice Durham relied on both defendant's affidavit and the
transcript of the plea to assess whether the defendant's guilty
plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, stating:
In order for defendant's guilty plea to be
valid and in compliance with rule 11(e)(5) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and
State v. Gibbons, the record must shown that
he was unequivocally and clearly informed
about the sentence that would be imposed.
Such evidence does not exist either in the
affidavit regarding the plea bargain or in
the transcript of the guilty plea. Thus,
rule 11(e) and State v. Gibbons require the
vacating of defendant's guilty plea on the
ground that it was not knowingly and
voluntarily made. . . .
777 P.2d at 466 (emphasis added).

Significantly, in his dissent

in Smith, Chief Justice Hall also applied the "knowing and
voluntary" standard in concluding that the defendant's plea was
valid, referring to both the transcript of the plea proceeding
9
and the defendant's affidavit. Ld. at 466-68.
In the instant case the record as a whole clearly
supports the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
o

Defendant's guilty plea was entered on September 15, 1987.
g
The State does not agree with this Court's reading of Smith in
its recent ruling in State v. Pharris, in which this Court stated
that the Utah Supreme Court in Smith "ruled that the test for
complying with rule 11 is the strict compliance test articulated
in Gibbons." Pharris, slip. op. at 8 n.6 (citing State v. Smith,
777 P.2d at 465.) The State can find no such holding in Smith.
No reference to rule 11 is made on the page cited, and the only
reference to Gibbons on that page concerns the elements necessary
for a sufficient affidavit.
-12-

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this £&' day of September,
1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

JUDITH S. H. ATHERTON
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Stephen R. McCaughey/ attorney for appellant, 72 East Fourth
South, Suite, 330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

day of

September, 1990.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

A P P E A R A N C E S

For the State of Utah:

For the Defendant:

Ms. Sherry Pagan
Deputy County Attorney
Provo, Utah 8460J

Mr. Bradley P. Rich
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake City, Utah

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

All right we wiJl take up the

State of Utah vs. Frank Gene Powell.
MR. RICH:
THE COURT:

Bradley Rich appearing with him.
This matter is before the court f

a change of plea.
MS. RAGAN:

Your Honor I have an amended info

that I would like to file at this time.
THE COURT:

Okay, come forward and be sworn.

(WHEREUPON, Ms. Ragan was put under oath by the Judge
with regard to the filing of the amended

information)

1
2

THE COURT:
information

3
4

that

Tliank you Your Honor

THE COURT:
to do with with

prepared

9

the a f f i d a v i t
various

to enter

no w e would

to

is the intent

T o the amended

and

previously

of your

client

i n f o r m a t i o n we
He and

affixed

are

I have been

his i n i t i a l s

over

to the

thereof.

THE C O U R T :

12

sworn

13

( W H E R E U P O N , Mr.Powell

14

to the q u e s t i o n s

15

BY T H E C O U R T :

M r . Powell raise

your

right hand

and b<j?

please.
w a s put under oath with

the court asks of

Q

P l e a s e state vour

name and date of

17

A

F r a n k Gene Powell

11/15/68.

18

Q

Do you read

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

What

and speak

the English

level of s c h o o l i n g

regard

him)

16

22

waive

this?

a plea of g u i l t y .

paragraphs

If

Okay what

regard

MR. R I C H :

8

21

amended

reading.

7

10

a r e a d i n g of this

Rich?

MR. R I C H ;

5
6

Mr.

Do you wish

birth?

language?

or e d u c a t i o n h a v e

you

attained?
MR. R I C H :
itself

He has gone through
reflects

as

21

the a f f i d a v i t

24

reads at a second or third g r a d e

25

have been over w i t h

to the 9th

a practical

matter

grade
he

level b e c a u s e of that I

him every paragraph

of this and

feels

3

that he understands it.

He does not feel comfortable

reading such a document but I have read it to him.
BY THE COURT:
Q Are you presently being treated for any mental
illness Mr. Powell?
A

No.

Q

You on any drugs or alcohol this morning?

A

No.

Q

No mind altering substances?

A

No.

Q

You have been

over this statement with your

attorney in some detail and you understand that you are
waiving certain constitutional rights when you plead
guilty?
A

Yes.

Q

Tho.se

constitutional rights have been fully-

explained to you by Mr. Rich?
A

Yes.

Q

You have initialled each of those appropriate

paragraphs?
A

Yes.

Q

And you are willing at this time to acknowledge

that those paragraphs are true and accurate?
A

Yes.

Q

Has anyone used any force, duress or coercion

A

:VO.

Q

May I have a factual basis for the charge?
MS. RAGAN:

Yes Your Honor on this date November

29, 1987 the defendant: and

the victim were both at

a party along with a number of other persons .
the course

of

the

night

the

defendant the victim

During
both

and there was some drinking going on and some conflict
between the two individuals , some fighting, verba] fighting
and that sort of thing.

They went out to the parking lot

10

at one point and the defendant entered his vehicle.

11

victim was standing in the parking lot.

12

lot and came around and struck the victim.

13

examiner determined that the cause of death was that blow

14

from the truck.

15

BY THE COURT:

1$

Q

The

He circled the park^nq
The medical

You have heard a statement of the facts as recited

|7

by the county attorney Mr. Powell is that true and accurate

18

statement?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

If if i 5 your intent to plead guilty you may sign

21
22
23

that statement?
(WHEREUPON, the defendant signs the statement)
THE COURT:

The record may show that the court

24

has discussed this matter with the county attorney's

25

office regarding the reduction

in the charge by the plea

185

bargain under the circumstances

and on the representations

of the county attorney's department regarding witnesses
to this matter and their testimony and the unavailability
of certain witnesses who were

there or their refusal

to testify that this is an appropriate plea bargain
and the court will accept that.
MR. RICH:

Thank you Judge.

THE COURT:

Yes thank you.

If I may approach

the Bench?
The record may show

that the court has received a statement of the defendant
before pleading guilty .

That he has appropriately

initialled each of the paragraphs .

This statement has

been signed by those parties required to sign the same.
The court will affix its signature.
The court has further received
signed by Mr. Rich in this matter.

an affidavit of counsel
The court will order

those documents to be made a part of the file.
BY THE COURT:
Q

Mr. Powell to the charge of Criminal Homicide

Manslaughter a Second Degree Felony what is your plea?
A

Guilty.
THE COURT:

The court will receive and accept

a plea of guilty in this matter.

Do you wish the matter

referred?
MR. RICH:

I would ask for a Pre-Sentence Report.

6

And if I could

I would ask that this be put over to the

8th of July which is the first Friday that my calendar
will accommodate being back down here.
THE COURT:
MR. RICH:

Is your client on bail?
He is on bail and I would ask that

remain?
THE COURT:

All right any reason why that should

not remain?
MS. RAGAN:

No Your Honor.

THE COUR^:

It will be the order of the court that

this matter be referred to the Adult Probation and Parole
Department for a Pre-Sentence Investigation and Report.

Mr.

Powee you will report back here on the 8th day of July ,
1988 at 8:00 A.M. for purposes of sentencing.
continue to be released on bail
posted in this matter.

You will

that you have currently

You will cooperate

with the Adult

Probation and Parole Department so that they may present
this court with a true and accurate Pre-Sentence Report.
Thank you .
MR. RICH:

Appreciate it Judge.

(WHERUEPON, this matter was concluded)

7

ADDENDUM B

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

1388 W 2 6 A«M|: 3 3
wiLL-.-tMr.-jis.'-.r.imfi.

********

STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NUMBER C $ ^ ^>% C°\

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT
BEFORE PLEADING GUILTY

)

Defendant.

)
********

COMES NOW ^-<a._^to xi (*-jfe ^ ^

(5? r^ c\ \., the defendant in

this case, and initials each paragraph below and signs this
statement on page five for the purpose of demonstrating to the
Court that he or she understands the following:

fP
J

*

r

1.

^L:

x

I understand that I am charged with the offense(s)
degree felony, or a Class

misdemeanor.

have read the Information with my attorney and I understand what
it says.
2.

My attorney and I have fully discussed my case and

how the charge (or charges) contained in the Information apply to
me.
/ /

3.

I understand that, if I plead guilty to this charge

(or these charges), I can be imprisoned or jailed for up to
years and that I can also receive a fine of up to $ \ C> ^ ^^)
r

'

4.

I understand that the judge may sentence me to

prison (or jail for a misdemeanor) and also fine me# or that he
can choose between these two possibilities.
1

/

/

5.

I understand that if I am sentenced on more than

one charge, the judge may allow my prison/jail terms for each
charge to run at the same time (concurrently) or one after the
oth^r^(consecutively).
/

6.

I understand that I have the right to be helped by

an attorney throughout my entire case, including a trial and an
appeal.

If I cannot afford my own attorney, the judge will

appoint one to help me.
J

*

7.

I understand that I have the right to plead "not

guilty" and go to trial if I want to do so.
8.

I understand that I have the right to a jury trial,

which includes the following:
A.

I have the right to be helped by an attorney;

B.

I have the right to see and listen to the

witnesses who testify against me;
C.

My

attorney

can

cross-examine

all the

witnesses who testify against me;
_

D.

I can call my own witnesses to help me, and if

they do not want to come to my trial, I can use subpoenas to
make them come and testify on my behalf;

r-P
' '

E.

I cannot be forced to take the witness stand

and admit my guilt, and I do not have to testify at my trial
unless I want to do so;
' '

F.

If I decide not to testify, the jury will be

instructed that they cannot assume that I am guilty just
because I did not testify;
G.

I understand that I am presumed to be innocent
2

of the charges against me, and that this presumption will
end only if each member of the jury is convinced of my
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
I go to trial and I am convicted, I have
the right to appeal my conviction.

If I cannot afford my

own attorney for my appeal, the State will pay the costs of
the appeal, including appointing an attorney to help me.
f^ I

9.

I understand that during the trial the State has

the burden of proving what are called "elements" of the charge
(charges) against me.

In my case the elements are as follows:

/r

A.

That I;

/ '

B.

In

g /)

^ S<^ K

V) T J ^ W

Or £ N G>

^Ov^&uv

County, State of Utah;

f/>
.

P.

;

G.

UL

10.

I understand that, if I plead guilty to the charges

contained in the Information, such a plea means that:

fP
y

'

A.

My plea of guilty is an admission of all the

elements listed in paragraph 9 above.
B.

I am giving up my right to a jury trial, my

right to a presumption of my innocence, my right to see and
cross-examine the witnesses against me, and my right not to
testify;
r r

C.

I am agreeing to allow the judge to find me

guilty of the charge (charges) against me;
3

_£

D.

I am relieving

the State of its job of

proving me guilty beyond a reasonable doubt;
I am agreeing to allow the judge to sentence
me for my crime without the benefit of a jury trial;
I am giving up my right to appeal the verdict
of the Court.

A'

11. I kn ow that when I enter my plea of guilty, the

judge may ask me questions under oath about the charges in this
case.

I must answer these questions, if they are asked on the

record and in the presence of my attorney, and I can be
prosecuted for perjury if I lie to the judge.
/

12.

I have entered into the following plea agreement

with the State:

Approved as to content
Deputy Utah County Attorney
13.

No threats or promises of any sort have been made

to force me or to persuade me to enter into this plea agreement,

Z / 7 14.

No one has promised me that I would receive a

lighter sentence because I am pleading guilty instead of going to
trial.

£L

15.

My attorney has informed me as to the sentence I

may actually receive if I plead guilty, but I understand that the
Court is not bound by my attorney's words.
4

j£

^ 16*

attorney

I understand

and t h e S t a t e

that

regarding

any agreements made
recommendations

between my

for sentencing

a r e n o t b i n d i n g upon t h e C o u r t .

i '

17. My decision to enter this plea has been made after

full and careful thought, with the advice of my attorney, and
with a full understanding

of my rights, the

facts

and

circumstances of my case and the possible results of this plea.
l

v

18.

I have discussed this case and this plea with my

attorney as much as I wish to do so.

I am satisfied with the

advice of my attorney.
19.

My attorney has helped me understand and fill out

this form.
/

20.

I am not now under the influence of any drugs,

medication or intoxicants, and I was not under the influence of
any drugs, medication or intoxicants when my attorney and I went
thrpuoh this form.
' "

21.

I am entering a plea of guilty to the charge

(charges) against me because I am, in fact, guilty of the charge
(charges).
22.

I know of no reason why I should not plead guilty

to the charge (charges) contained in the Information.
23.

I have the following educational background;

I can read, write, and understand the English
language^*
25.

- ^ Y \*-*>

C P<MD ^

u £vfev,

I am not presently being treated for mental illness

that would affect my ability to voluntarily and knowingly make
this guilty plea.
Signed in open court this

J—^

of

19 Sp/P

ADefendant
CoutTBel) for D<|ftendant

• x s t n p t Court Judge

6
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ADDENDUM C

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO&RT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
<^>l^W^^
******

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANK GENE POWELL,
Defendant,

CASE NUMBER CR 88 69
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE
******

This matter came regularly for hearing before the court on
the Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. Deputy County
Attorney Carlyle Kay Bryson appeared for the State of Utah.
The defendant was present and represented by Stephen R.
McCaughey Esq. Defendant, Frank Gene Powell, and his former
attorney Bradley P. Rich, Esq. were sworn and testified. The
court having heard the evidence, having reviewed the file,
together with transcripts, and being fully advised in the
premises now finds and concludes as follows:
FINDINGS
1. On November 29, 1987 while attending the same party
Mr. Powell and Glen Candland started name-calling and
threatening each other. At about 1:30 a.m. these men went
outside to fight, but bystanders prevented this fight. Then
Mr. Powell crossed the street with two friends and climbed into
his pickup truck, and again started calling Mr. Candland
names. Mr. Candland followed the defendant to his truck, and
begain hitting the truck's windshield with his fists. Mr.
Powell left the parking lot by driving backwards, circling
around, and finally entering a public road. Mr. Powell
re-entered the parking lot by a second driveway where his truck
hit and killed Mr. Candland.
2. Mr. Powell fled the area. A warrent for his arrest
was issued on a charge of criminal homicide, murder in the
second degree. Mr. Powell through the office of his attorney,

Bradley P. Rich, was surrendered to the police. Mr. Powell's
charge was reduced by plea bargaining, and he plead gulity to
the charge of manslaughter. He was sentenced to prison on July
26, 1988.
3. On September 28, 1989, after about one year in prison,
Mr. Powell made a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. He states he
could not read well enough to understand the consequences of
his guilty plea, and his attorney did not properly advise him.
4. Utah Code Section 77-35-11 (1987) states the court may
not accept a guilty plea until it has found the defendant
understands his rights including: right to counsel, right
against self incrimination, right to a jury trial, right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses. Also the defendant must
understand the elements of the offense and proof required, the
sentence that may be imposed, any plea agreement reached, and
the time limit for withdrawal of the plea. These findings tend
to show that the defendant understands the consequences of
pleading guilty.
5. In companion cases Warner v. Morris, and Brooks v.
Morris, the Supreme Court of Utah stated that although the
defendant had not been asked specifically about one of his
constitutional rights the record as a whole affirmatively
established that the defendant entered his plea with knowledge
of its consequences including waiver of the constitutional
right. Warner v. Morris. 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985) and
Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985). A review to
determine if Rule 11(e) has been complied with has been based
on the record as a whole.
6. In State v. Gibbons the Utah Supreme Court stressed
the trial court's duty to ensure Rule 11(e) and constitutional
requirement's are satisifed before a guilty plea is accepted.
State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d. 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). The court
reviewed the U.S. Supreme court cases, and detailed the
requirements necessary for an affidavit made in advance of plea
to be sufficient. Gibbons at 1313. The affidavit should (a),

be signed by the defendant, his attorney, the prosecutor, and
the trial judge; (b), list the names and the degrees of the
crimes charged; (c), contain both a statement of the elements
of the offenses and a synopsis of the defendant's acts that
establish the elements of the crime charged; (d), clearly state
the allowable punishment for the crimes charged and should note
that multiple punishments for mulitiple crimes may be imposed
consecutively; (e), list individually and specifically the
rights waived by the entry of the guilty plea; (f), details of
any plea bargain should be set fourth in the affidavit, as well
as a disclaimer concerning any sentencing recommendations as
required by Rule 11(e); (g), disclose the defendant's ability
to read and understand the English language, the absence of
promises to induce the plea, and the defendant's competancy.
Gibbons at 1313-14. In conclusion the court in Gibbons stated
that the trial judge should review the affidavit made in
advance of plea, and question the defendant's understanding of
it. Gibbons at 1314. "If the court does not use an affidavit,
the requirements set forth in Section 77-35-11 must be followed
and be on the record." Gibbons at 1314.
7. Following Gibbons there was some confusion concerning
whether the record as a whole was still the basis for review.
This confusion developed from a Utah Appellate Court case State
v. Visilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah App. 1988).

The

appellate court interpreted the Gibbons decision in State v.
Visilacopulos, and determined from Gibbons that the "record as
a whole test" had been replaced. Visilacopulos at 94. The
appellate court stated that trial courts may not rely on advice
of counsel or affidavit made in advance of plea to satisfy the
requirements of rule 11(e), but must conduct an on-the-record
review. Visilacopulos at 94.
8. However, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Gibbons, "If
the court does not use an affidavit, the requirements set forth
in Section 77-35-11 must be followed and be on the record."
Gibbons at 1314. Also in Jolivet v. Cook, one of the most

recent Utah Supreme Court cases on this subject, the record as
a whole test was reaffirmed. Jolivet v. Cook, 115 Utah Adv.
Rep. 17, 18 (1989). Because the record as whole test has been
affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court, and it is consistent with a
totality of the circumstances analysis used by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637; 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257
(1976), the standard for reviewing Mr. Powell's guilty plea is
the record as a whole.
9. In this case the record as a whole shows the defendant
understood the guilty plea he made and the rights he was
waiving. The affidavit made in advance of plea included
signatures of the defendant, his attorney, the county
prosecutor, and the court. It stated he was charged with the
crime of manslaughter, a second degree felony; and listed the
elements of the crime as causing unlawfully and recklessly the
death of Glen Candland. It described maximum punishment of a
prison term of up to 15 years and a fine of up to $10,000. The
Defendant's rights were included in the affidavit as follows:
the right to an attorney, trial by jury, confront and
cross-examine witnesses, call witnesses, avoid taking the
witness stand, presumption of innocence, conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt, appeal a conviction. It states that these
rights are waived by pleading guilty, and allows the judge to
impose a sentence for the crime charged.
See, Statement by
Defendant Before Pleading Guilty.
10. The trial judge directly questioned the defendant to
determine his understanding of this affidavit. The judge
asked, "What level of school or education have you attained?11
The defendant's attorney Mr. Brad Rich, (an experienced
criminal defense lawyer, with a fine reputation and a memeber
of a well recognised criminal defense law firm) responded,
"He has gone through to the 9th grade the affidavit
itself reflects as a practical matter he reads at a
second or third grade level because of that I have
been over with him every paragraph of this and feel
that he understands it. He does not feel comfortable
reading such a document but I have read it to him."
(Hearing Transcript Criminal No. CR-88-69, page 3-4.)
4
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The court directly asked the defendant, "You have been over
this statement with your attorney in some detail and you
understand that you are waiving certain constitutional rights
when you plead guilty?" Defendant responded, "yes." The judge
then asked, "Those constitutional rights have been fully
explained to you by Mr. Rich?" The defendnat responded,
"yes." (Hearing Transcript Criminal No. CR-88-69, page 4.)
The trial judge asked to have a factual basis for the charge.
The county attorney read a statement of the facts which the
defendant acknowledged as a true and accurate statement.
(Hearing Transcript Criminal No. CR-88-69, page 5.) The trial
judge stated the charge had been reduced by a plea bargain, and
because of witnesses unavailibility it was an appropriate plea
bargain. (Hearing Transcript Criminal No. CR-88-69, page
5-6.) Only after these findings had been made was the
defendant's guilty plea accepted.
11. However, testimony at the time of sentencing
directly conflicts with testimony Mr. Powell gave in his
affidavit supporting the Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty.
The Affidavit of Frank Powell states:
"My attorney, Brad Rich, did not read the 'the
statement by defendant' to me and I was unable to read
and understand it on my own; I believed that if I did
not like any sentence imposed, I had a right to appeal
to the Utah Supreme Court; I did not understand that I
was giving up my right to have a jury trial; I did not
understand that I was waiving or giving up my
constitutional rights by pleading guilty." (Affidavit
of Frand Powell, page 1-2.)
If this statement is true it indicates that both Mr. Powell and
his attorney committed perjury. There is a direct conflict
between the statements made at the hearing when the guilty plea
was accepted and the statements in the affidavit supporting
withdrawl of the guilty plea.

1*79

12. Defendant further testified at the time of the
hearing on defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea as
follows:
Question: "And did Mr. Rich instruct you to sign your
initals on each paragraph?
Answer: "Yes."
Question: " Okay did you realize at that time that
what did Mr. Rich tell you at the time he started
describing or instructing you in that document?"
Answer: "He told me that pleading guilty to a
manslaughter would be the best that he could do. That
I would go out to the Utah State Prison and do 18
months."
Question: "Did he tell you were giving up a right to a
fast and speedy trial?"
Answer: " Yes he did."
Question: "What did he tell you about a right to
appeal?"
Answer: "He said that I had the right to appeal."
Question: "You had the right to appeal?"
Answer: "Yes."
Question: "Did yo know you were giving up the right to
have a trial?"
Answer: "No I really didn't. I thought I was going to
a trial."
Queation: "Did you know that you were giving up your
right to testify?"
Answer: "No I didn't.
Question: "Did you know you were giving your right to
cross examine witnesses?"
Answer: "No."
Question: "Let me call your attention to paragraph
9(c) excuse me 10(c) that says, I am agreeing to allow
the judge to find me guilty of the charge against me.
Is that what you intended to do?"
Answer: "No I didn't."
Question: "What did you think was going to happen Mr.
Powell?"
Answer: "I thought that we still get you know go to
court and hear a trial and the thing go from there."
Question: "Did you think you were going to be able to
present your side of the story to the court?"
Answer: " Yes I did."
Question: "What about witnesses did you think you were
going to be able to hear the witnesses testify against
you?"
Answer: "I heard some of them."
Question: "That was at the Preliminary Hearing right?"
Answer: "Yes."

-I ^ o

Question: "Did you think you were going to hear them
at a trial?"
Answer: "Yes."
(Hearing Transcript, on Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea, page 6-7.)
13. Attorney Brad Rich's testimony was generally
contradictory to Defendant's, and in particular he testified on
direct examination as follows:
Question: "In fact I think in the document marked
Exhibit 'A' it indicates in your handwriting that he
can read to a third gread level and I think that is
what you told the court was it not?"
Answer: "That is correct. That was my understanding
that his reading ability was about a third or fourth
grade level."
Question: "What about his ability to understand
English, comprehend the English Language?"
Answer: "I don't regard Frank as a stupid person. He
does suffer from, did then worse than now, suffer from
a lack of a formal education and his vocabulary was
limited. He was bright enough in any number of ways
but certainly true that he wasn't sophisticated in
legal jargon or in an extensive vocabulary."
(Hearing Transcript, on Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea, page 16.)
Contines next page.
Question: "Exhibit No. 1 excuse me. Exhibit 1 and why
don't you just tell the court what happened in
realtion to that and when it happened?"
Answer: "All right I had talked to Frank over the
telephone about the proposed plea bargain earlier and
at that time had gone over in limited fashion what his
rights were. We met on the morning that this document
was signed here outside the courtroom in the hallway
and in the coffee shop discussed, for a period of
time, informally what rights he would be waiving and
what the penalties were and what my predictions of
what the court would do and what the Board of Pardons
would do. Then we turned our attention to this
document.
I went throught this document with Frank
paragraph by paragraph. As Frank said, I read some of
it to him knowing that he was limited in reading. I
would say to do that it became obvious as we started
that and after I had read a few paragraphs to him that
the language there was, in some cases, confusing to
him and difficult for him to understand.

Question: "When you say #the language there' you are
referring to the language there in front of you is
that right Exhibit 1?"
Answer: "That is right. The language in the affidavit
itself was confusing to him. I attempted with every
paragraph to paraphrase that in simplier language that
I thought he could understand. We stoped really after
every paragraph or almost every paragraph and had a
discussion."
Question: "I see in your opinion, Mr. Rich, is there
do you think that there is a possibility that Frank
was confused about what he was doing or wasn't really
sure of the proecess of what was going to happen to
him?"
Answer: "I know that Frank's understandang of what was
going on was more limited than my typical client no
doubt about it. I felt that he, in the end,
understood and had answered all the, I had answered
all the question that he had about it. I would not
have plead him guilty to this charge if I did not feel
that he understood that. At the same time I know that
Frank struggled with that more than most."
(Hearing Transcript, on Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea, page 17-18.)
Attorney Brad Rich testified on cross examinationas
Question: "Do you have any idea Mr. Rich how many
criminal defendants you have represented over your
career as a defense attorney?"
Answer: "Certainly hundreds."
Quesiton: "You have never encouraged any to plead
guilty I assume, that you weren't satisified with that
they understood what they were doing?"
Answer: "Absolutely."
Question: "You have indicated that?"
Answer: "I have I would not ever plead any client
guilty if it was not my firmest belief that they
understood exactly the rights that they were waiving
and what the penalities attached to that plea were."
Question: "So based on you experience with hundreds of
clients criminal defendant clients you also had your
firmest belief or had a firm belief that Mr. Powell
understood?"
Answer: "I did."
Question: "Do you recall the morning Mr. Powell
entered his plea of guilty the court inquiring of Mr.
Powell about his level of eduaction and his
intelligence level?"
Answer: "I remember that."
(Hearing Transcript, on Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea, page 19-20.)

Continues next page.
Question: "So you did go over every single paragraph
with this with him?"
Answer: "I did.11
Question: WI read a number of the items and for those
items that I didn't read verbatim I dealt specifically
with that paragraph in detail in words that I felt he
was better able to understand than the original
there. I don't know how many paragraphs, I thank I
could look back through this document and see how many
times I would have been forced to paraphrase from the
original. My memory is that it would have been a
couple of three times that I chose to alter the what I
felt to be words beyond his understanding and to words
that he more easily understood."
In addition to that with a number of these
paragraphs I would have chose to paraphrase somewhat
in that I might have said and the next paragraph says
that you understand that you have the right to plead
not guilty and have the right to go to trial if you
wish to. So in that sense that paragraph would have
been changed to, the one I am looking at is Number 7
of Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 to reflect my saying,
'you understand that you have the right to plead not
guilty' rather than the first person that is included
in there. There would have been a number of times
when I would have paraphrased in that fashion to
change it."
(Hearing Transcript, on Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea, page 21-22.)
Continues on page 29.
Question: "Do you recall specifically discussing any
other rights at that time that he might waive in
entering a pela of guilty?"
Answer: "I know that we discussed what the penalities
were and what the elements of the offenses were what
the penalities were both in terms of prison time and
the fine. We discussed the fact that the judge would
be making the decision on that as to whether he would
get prison or jail time. That he would be waiving the
right to a jury, right to trial, right to have me
cross examine the witnesses, right for him to testify
and be cross examined in that setting.
Question: "So you went through that with him on at
least two occasions?"
Answer:"That is correct."
Question: "Were there any other occasions where you
went through that list of rights with him that you
recall?"

Answer: MAs I said earilier we really discussed this
in three different contexts, first over the telephone,
then in person here outside the courtroom in an
informal discussion where I attempted to answer any
questions that we hadn't discussed. I went through
this list generally to make sure that he understood
where we were headed. Then a third time right after
that with the affidavit in hand going over that
statement paragraph by paragraph.,f
(Hearing Transcript, on Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea, page 29-30.)
15. The facts and circumstances surrounding the Motion to
Withdraw Plea of Guilty indicate the defendant's motive was not
related to his lack of knowledge. Defendant anticipated an 18
month prison term based on his counsel's expectations, but
after one year in prison he found that he would not be paroled
for another 18 months. (See, transcript of Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea, pages 7 lines 24-35, page 8 lines 1-14, and page
25 lines 11-25.) Defendant now claims he did not understand
the consequences his of guilty plea. The totality of the
circumstances of this case indicate Defendant's motive is
"buyer's remorse."
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The record as a whole is still a valid standard for
reviewing withdrawl of a guilty plea. A review of the record
as a whole supports finding the requirements of Section
77-35-11 were satisfied. All the facts and circumstances, at
the time the plea was accepted, supported the court finding the
defendant understood his guilty plea and its consequences. The
affidavit made in advance of plea, the court's questions with
the defendant's answers, and a reading of the facts which
defendant acknowledged as true and accurate satisfy the
requirements of Section 77-35-11. This is further supported by
the testimony of attorney Brad Rich during the Motion to
Withdraw the Guilty Plea. The court finds and concluds the
testimony of attorney Brad Rich to be more beilived than that
of the defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is denied.
Dated this 30th day of March 1990.
BY THE COURT

BOYD
cc:

L. PARK, DISTRICT JUDGE

Deputy County Attorney Carlyle Kay Bryson
Stephen R. McCaughey, Esq.

